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Reference Group Effects in the Measurement of Personality
and Attitudes5
MARCUS CREDE´,1 MICHAEL BASHSHUR,2 AND SARAH NIEHORSTER3
1Department of Psychology, State University of New York at Albany
2Universitat Pompeu Fabra
3State University of New York at Albany
Reference-group effects (discovered in cross-cultural settings) occur when responses to self-report items are based not on respondents’ absolute
level of a construct but rather on their level relative to a salient comparison group. In this article, we examine the impact of reference-group effects
on the assessment of self-reported personality and attitudes. Two studies illustrate that a reference-group effect can be induced by small changes to
instruction sets, changes that mirror the instruction sets of commonly used measures of personality. Scales that specified different reference groups
showed substantial reductions in criterion-related validities for academic performance, self-reported counterproductive behaviors, and self-reported
health outcomes relative to reference-group-free versions of those scales.
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15
Test takers’ responses to self-report inventories of personalityQ1
Q2 have been shown to be influenced by a wide variety of phe-
nomena other than the individual test taker’s absolute stand-
ing on the construct being assessed. These phenomena include20
response biases such as faking (e.g., Zickar & Robie, 1999),
socially desirable responding (e.g., Detrick & Chibnall, 2008),
and yea-saying and nay-saying (e.g., Knowles & Condon, 1999),
as well as the order of questions (e.g., Benton & Daly, 1991;
Gaskell, Wright, & Muircheartaigh, 1995; Schwarz & Hippler,25
1995) and even the format and nature of the instructions and
response options used for the inventory (e.g., Schwarz, 1990,
1999; Schwarz, Hippler, Deutsch, & Strack, 1985). As a result,
test developers have attempted to design tests and items in a
manner that reduces the impact of these artifacts (e.g., inclusion30
of validity scales, balancing positive and negative item content).
An additional possible influence on the manner in which indi-
viduals respond to self-report inventories of personality has been
identified by researchers in the cross-cultural domain, where it
is referred to as the reference-group effect (RGE; Heine, Buch-35
tel, & Norenzayan, 2008; Heine, Lehman, Peng, & Greenholtz,
2002; McCrae, Terracciano, Realo, & Allik, 2007; Takano &
Sogon, 2008). The RGE reflects the influence of comparison
others on the responses to individual self-report items and has
primarily been found to influence responses to measures of40
individualism–collectivism. In this study, we are the first to ex-
amine whether the RGE also extends to self-report measures of
personality and what the impact of any RGE is likely to have
on the criterion validity of scores on self-report measures of
personality.45
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In the cross-cultural literature, it is a widely held belief that
East Asians have higher levels of collectivism and lower lev-
els of individualism than North Americans (Takano & Osaka,
1999), but studies that have measured these two constructs in
East Asia and North America have frequently found this be- 50
lief unsupported. Indeed, of 76 such studies reviewed by Heine
et al. (2002), 34 reported data that indicated higher levels of col-
lectivism and/or lower levels of individualism in North America
than in East Asia (i.e., a pattern opposite to the expected pattern).
The RGE explanation for this phenomenon is based on an exten- 55
sion of social comparison theory (Festinger, 1954). Festinger ar- Q3
gued that individuals have an innate need to evaluate themselves
and that this evaluation will, in the absence of objective informa-
tion, be based on a comparison with others around them. These
are generally spontaneous and unintentional comparison pro- 60
cesses that can shape self-perceptions without the individual’s
awareness (Heine et al., 2002). This comparison is generally
made with similar others, typically individuals with whom the
individual has some familiarity. RGE researchers have extended
the logic of the social comparison theory to argue that this com- 65
parison process can influence how respondents rate themselves
on Likert-style scales. Given that the act of responding to the
items of a self-report inventory requires self-evaluation on the
construct being assessed, similar comparison processes may be
activated while responding to an inventory of, say, collectivism 70
(or other individual difference constructs). An individual de-
scribing his/her level of collectivism will therefore base his/her Q4
description partly on his/her standing relative to the perceived
collectivism of a comparison group (e.g., people from the same
national culture). Heine et al. (2002) argued that the mean of the 75
response-option continuum on a Likert-style item represents the
perceived average standing of the reference group on the con-
structs; and further, that it is the respondent’s relative standing
to this reference group that determines whether the respondent
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selects a response option that is above or below this midpoint.80
Thus, it is thought that East Asians responding to a Likert-style
inventory assessing their level of individualism will base their
responses not on their absolute level of individualism but rather
on their level of individualism relative to a salient reference
group (i.e., other East Asians). Similarly, North Americans re-85
sponding to a measure of collectivism are likely to base their
responses to items on their perceived standing relative to a norm
group comprised of other North Americans. Given the use of dif-
ferent reference groups, a direct comparison of the mean scores
of North Americans and East Asians is thought to have ques-90
tionable validity (Heine et al., 2002). Unfortunately, the RGE
not only suggests that cross-cultural comparisons of variables
assessed using Likert-type scales are likely to have low valid-
ity but also suggests that the measurement of other individual
differences may be similarly affected, even if the measurement95
only occurs within a single culture. This is because the social
comparison mechanisms that underpin the RGE are also likely
to manifest themselves in other domains that require individuals
to make judgments about their standing on a dimension. One
such domain is the measurement of personality.100
Typical self-report inventories of personality traits contain
a series of descriptive phrases or statements that are thought
to be reflective of the assessed personality traits. Individuals
responding to these inventories are asked to indicate the degree
to which these statements represent accurate descriptions of105
themselves via the use of Likert scales. Social comparison theory
would suggest that responses to such inventories are influenced
by a process in which individuals compare their own standing
on the trait in question to comparison others, in a manner akin to
the process influencing responses to inventories of collectivism110
or individualism. Indeed, it is possible that the RGE is stronger
for self-report measures of constructs that fall outside of the
domain of cross-cultural psychology.
Cross-cultural researchers typically assume that test takers
within a culture make use of the same reference group (i.e.,115
East Asians in general, North Americans in general), but the as-
sumption of a universal reference group may not be valid for the
measurement of other individual differences such as personality
or attitudes. Indeed, it could be argued that reference groups
other than the national population are more likely to be used120
by test takers in many research and applied settings because
more specific reference groups are likely to be more salient or
cognitively accessible (e.g., availability heuristic; Tversky &
Kahneman, 1973) or, in social comparison theory terms, be-
cause the reference group is similar to the individual in some125
important way (Festinger, 1954; Goethals & Darley, 1977). For
example, a job applicant may base his/her responses to a person-
ality inventory more on his/her standing relative to the perceived
standing of other applicants or job incumbents rather than his/her
standing relative to the general population of his/her country. In130
this case, the setting in which the information is being collected
(e.g., employment selection setting) suggests that an individ-
ual’s responses are likely to be compared to the responses of
other applicants (or of job incumbents), thereby triggering the
use of individuals from that particular reference group. An-135
other possible reason for the use of more specific reference
groups may simply be that the test taker has a better understand-
ing of his/her standing relative to the specific reference group
than his/her standing relative to the population as a whole (and
can therefore also access that information more readily). For140
example, the responses of a high school student may be based
on that student’s perceived standing relative to other high school
students or even his or her immediate peer group.
The use of different reference groups may, of course, not only
be implicitly activated by the nature of the setting or the purpose 145
of data collection but can also be explicitly cued by the instruc-
tions or response formats that accompany an inventory. This is
especially important to consider given that prominent invento-
ries of personality already differ with respect to whether a ref-
erence group is specified in the instruction set. For example, the 150
instruction set of the widely used International Personality Item
Pool (IPIP; Goldberg et al., 2006) specifies a reference group
(scales such as these are hereafter referred to as “reference-
group measures”) which is comprised of people known to the
respondent and of the same age and gender. The instruction set 155
provided for IPIP scales reads as follows: “Describe yourself
as you honestly see yourself, in relation to other people you
know of the same sex as you are, and roughly your same age.”
A similar instruction set is used by the similarly widely used
scales developed by Saucier (1994). The instructions given for 160
many other self-report measures, such as the Minnesota Mul-
tiphasic Personality Inventory (Hathaway & McKinley, 1943), Q5
do not specify a reference group at all (such scales are hereafter
referred to as “reference-group-free measures”).
Understanding the possible impact of different reference- 165
group relevant instruction sets is important for a theoretical
understanding of the processes that determine responses to self-
report inventories. These effects are also important for deter-
mining whether the scores on inventories that differ in the use
of specified reference groups can be meaningfully compared to 170
each other and what reference groups (if any) should be specified
to maximize criterion-related validity.
REFERENCE GROUP EFFECTS ON SCALE SCORES
If responses to psychological inventories are influenced by the
mechanisms outlined by the RGE (Heine et al., 2002), then an 175
individual test taker’s scores on a measure should vary depend-
ing on the reference group being utilized. That is, test takers’
scores are a function of their relative standing on the trait, and,
as reference groups change, test takers’ scores on a trait measure
should also change. For example, test takers may indicate high 180
levels of conscientiousness relative to their friends, low levels
relative to their parents, and average levels relative to people of
the same age and gender.
Hypothesis 1: Versions of a scale that specify different reference groups
will produce scores that are meaningfully different from each other and 185
different from a reference-group-free version of the same scale.
REFERENCE GROUP EFFECTS ON VALIDITY
The use of reference groups is likely to represent a signifi-
cant threat to the criterion validity of inventory scores. Consider,
for example, the hypothetical example in which test takers are 190
asked to base their responses to the items of a measure of con-
scientiousness on their level of conscientiousness relative to
their friends (the reference group). Each test taker is likely to
have a group of friends that is different in terms of the dis-
tribution of conscientiousness, and test takers’ responses will 195
therefore reflect neither their absolute level of conscientiousness
nor their level of conscientiousness relative to a common refer-
ence group. That is, two test takers may have identical levels of
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Person A Person B
Perceived standing 
higher than reference 
group
Perceived standing 
lower than reference 
group
Low Level of Trait
High Level of Trait
Perceived standing of 
reference group
Absolute standing on 
trait
FIGURE 1.—Illustration of the effect of reference-group comparisons on personality trait scale scores.
conscientiousness but respond to the items in a fundamentally
different way based on their use of different peer reference200
groups. Figure 1 illustrates this issue in more detail. Person A
has a higher absolute level of the trait in question than Person
B but uses a reference group that has even higher average levels
of the trait, whereas Person B uses a reference group that has
even lower average levels of the trait. The result is that Person205
A will arrive at a judgment that he/she has low levels of the trait
relative to his/her reference group, whereas Person B will arrive
at a judgment that he/she has high levels of the trait relative to
his/her reference group.
Reference groups do, of course, vary in the degree to which210
they objectively differ across test takers and we anticipate that
the threat to validity would be lower for reference groups that are
so broad as to ensure that perceptions of the reference group are
relatively similar across test takers (e.g., people in general) than
for reference groups whose objective standing on the construct215
in question will vary to a greater degree from person to person
(e.g., your immediate family, close friends).
Hypothesis 2a: Reference-group measures of a construct will exhibit
lower correlations with relevant criteria than a reference-group-free
measure of the same construct.220
Hypothesis 2b: The difference in the criterion-related validity between
a reference-group-free measure and a reference-group measure of a
construct will increase as the utilized reference group becomes more
specific to the individual test taker.
STUDY 1225
In Study 1 of this article, we explored (a) whether the RGE
can be activated through changes to the instructions of personal-
ity and attitudes inventories and (b) whether the RGE produces
meaningful differences in criterion-related validities between
measures of the same construct for criteria that have previously230
been shown to exhibit correlations with the personality and
attitude variables. In particular, we examined the relationship
of conscientiousness with behaviors that have previously been
shown to exhibit relationships with conscientiousness: procras-
tination (e.g., Steel, 2007) and health behaviors (e.g., Martin, 235
Friedman, & Schwartz, 2007).
Method
Participants. The sample for this study consisted of 163
undergraduate students drawn from the psychology subject pool
at a large, public Midwestern university. The sample was largely 240
Caucasian (83%) and female (55%), with an average age of 18.6 Q6
years of age.
Measures
Conscientiousness. Conscientiousness was assessed with
a 10-item measure from the International Item Pool (Goldberg 245
et al., 2006). We administered this scale with one reference- Q7
group-free format and four additional versions that included
an explicit reference group. In these explicit reference group
versions, respondents were instructed to indicate their level of
conscientiousness in comparison to (a) their immediate family, 250
(b) people of the same age and gender, (c) close friends and
peers, and (d) people in general. Respondents were asked to
indicate their level of agreement with items using a 5-point re-
sponse scale ranging from 1 (Far less accurate for me than for
my immediate family) to 5 (Far more accurate for me than for my 255
immediate family). The scales were scored so that high scores
reflect high levels of conscientiousness. The order of the four
reference-group conditions was varied using a Latin-squares
design to counteract potential ordering effects. We always ad-
ministered the reference-group-free version of the scale first 260
to ensure that responses to this scale were not affected by a
previously cued comparison with a reference group.
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TABLE 1.—Correlations between measures of conscientiousness (Study 1).
No. Measure M SD 1 2 3 4 5
1 Conscientiousness: 3.60 .64 .83
No reference
2 Conscientiousness: 2.93 .59 .44 .83
Family reference
3 Conscientiousness: 3.60 .62 .64 .24 .86
Same age/gender reference
4 Conscientiousness: 3.25 .48 .39 .28 .39 .83
Peer group reference
5 Conscientiousness: 3.34 .63 .66 .46 .66 .43 .86
People in general reference
Note. N = 164. Internal consistency estimates (α) are presented along the diagonal in
italics.
Procrastination. We assessed procrastination using the 20-
item Procrastination Scale developed by Lay (1986). Respon-
dents are asked to indicate their level of agreement with items265
using a 4-point response scale ranging from 1 (Strongly Dis-
agree) to “4 (Strongly Agree). We scored the scale so that high
scores reflect low levels of procrastination.
Health behaviors. Health behaviors were assessed with the
40-item Health Behavior Checklist (Vickers, Conway, & Hervig,270
1990) that is comprised of four subscales: Preventative Health
Behaviors, Accident Control, Traffic Risk Behaviors, and Sub-
stance Risk. Respondents are asked to indicate their level of
agreement with each statement using a 5-point response for-
mat ranging from 1 (Disagree Strongly) to 5 (Agree Strongly).275
Subscales were scored so that high scores reflect high levels of
healthy behaviors.
Subjective weighting of reference groups. At the end of
the experiment, we asked participants to indicate the relative im-
portance of each of the four reference groups in arriving at their280
responses to the reference-group-free condition by distributing
100 points across the four reference groups.
Results
Table 1 presents the zero order correlations, reliability esti-
mates, and means and standard deviations of the five measures285
of conscientiousness. Reliability estimates are high for scores
on all measures of conscientiousness, and a comparison of the
reliability estimates of the five measures of conscientiousness
in which we used the procedure developed by Feldt and Anken-
mann (1998) found no significant differences. Scores on the290
reference-group-free version of conscientiousness were most
strongly correlated with scores on the version making use of the
“people in general” reference group and the “same age and gen-
der” reference group. Interestingly, the subjective weights pro-
vided by participants indicated the lowest mean weights given 295
to these two reference groups: 18% (SD = 11.5) for people
of same age and gender and 13% (SD = 13.3) for people in
general. Significantly (p <. 01) higher subjective weights were
given for the family reference group and the peer group ref-
erence group with mean weights of 33.6% (SD = 16.9) and 300
35.3% (SD = 12.9), respectively. Importantly, none of the cor-
relations with the reference-group-free version of the scale were
large enough to suggest that all participants relied on a single
reference group when arriving at responses to the items of the
reference-group-free version of the scale. Further, if participants 305
are consciously aware of the reference group that they are ac-
tually using when making comparisons in the reference-group-
free version, then the relationship between the score produced
by a measure of conscientiousness with that reference group and
the score produced by the reference-group-free version of the 310
scale should be moderated by the subjective weight given to the
scale. We therefore used moderated regression analysis to ex-
amine whether the subjective weight given to a reference group
moderated the relationship between the reference-group version
of the scale and the reference-group-free version of the scale. 315
No significant moderation effect was detected for any of the
four reference groups. This indicates that participants were not
consciously aware of the reference group comparisons that most
strongly influenced their responses to the reference-group-free
version of the scale. Alternately, it may be that participants do 320
not use reference-group comparisons in arriving at responses to
the reference-group-free version of the scale but are using some
other strategy for arriving at responses to items (e.g., assessing
their absolute standing on the trait by a consideration of their
behaviors that does not rely on comparisons with others). 325
Mean differences across reference group conditions. The
mean score for conscientiousness was lowest for the immediate
family reference group, with the highest scores being observed
for the reference-group-free condition and the for the same-age-
and-gender condition. Repeated-measures analysis of variance 330
(ANOVA) was used to examine the mean differences across all
five measures of conscientiousness. In support of Hypothesis
1, we observed a significant effect, F (X, XXX) = 59.84, p <
.01, and relatively large overall effect size (partial eta squared Q8
= .29), illustrating that the use of different reference groups 335
results in meaningfully different scores on measures of con-
scientiousness. Focused contrasts of the reference-group-free
measure with each of the four reference-group measures of con-
scientiousness yielded effect size estimates (Cohen’s d) of 1.09,
TABLE 2.—Correlations of scores on reference-group-free and reference-group measures of conscientiousness with five criteria (Study 1).
Criterion No Reference Family Same Age and Peer Group People in
Criteria Reliability (α) Group Reference Gender Reference Reference General Reference
Procrastination .88 .44a .32bc .24bc .19c .34b
Preventive health .67 .09a −.01a .08a .02a .09a
Accident control .63 .20a −.02bc .11bc .02bc .15b
Traffic risk .58 −.43a −.36a −.44a −.17b −.35a
Substance risk .62 −.43a −.30ab −.27b .00c −.34ab
Note. N = 164. Correlations with different subscripts across conditions signify statistically significant (p < .05) differences in correlation coefficients with the criterion. Calculations
are based on the Meng, Rosenthal, and Rubin (1992) procedure for comparing correlated correlation coefficients.
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TABLE 3.—Incremental validity of four reference-group measures of conscientiousness over the reference-group-free measure of conscientiousness (Study 1).
Incremental Validity Over Reference-Group Free Measure of Conscientiousness
Immediate Family Same Age and Gender Friends and Peers People in General
R p R p R p R p
Procrastination .02 .04 .003 .44 .000 .78 .005 .32
Preventive health behaviors .003 .51 .001 .73 .000 .83 .002 .61
Accident control .014 .12 .001 .68 .004 .44 .000 .78
Traffic risk behaviors .035 .01 .045 <.01 .000 .99 .007 .25
Substance risk .015 .09 .000 .88 .032 .01 .005 .32
Note. All R values are adjusted R values.
0.00, 0.63, and 0.41 for the family, same age and gender, peer340
group, and people in general reference groups, respectively. A
Cohen’s d of around 0.50 is often interpreted as signifying a
medium effect, whereas Cohen’s d of greater than 0.80 is often
interpreted as signifying a large effect (e.g., Cohen, 1988).
Table 2 presents the correlations between scores on the five345
measures of conscientiousness and the five criteria. In support
of Hypothesis 2a, the correlations observed for the reference-
group-free version of the Conscientiousness scale were highest
for all five criteria and significantly different to many of the
correlations observed for scores on the other versions of the350
scale. In support of Hypothesis 2b, the lowest criterion-related
validities were observed for scores on the scale that made use
of peers as a reference group. Low internal consistency esti-
mates were found for scores on the four subscales of the Health
Behavior Checklist, which is not surprising given the relatively355
smaller number of items in the scales and the low base rate of
the phenomena assessed by individual items.
We assessed the discriminant validity of the various measures
of conscientiousness using confirmatory factor analysis by com-
paring the chi-square values for a single-factor solution of the360
items assessing the two most highly correlated measures of con-
scientiousness (the version in which respondents were asked to
“compare yourself with people of the same age and gender” and
the version in which respondents were asked to “compare your-
self with people in general”) with a two-factor solution in which365
items from the two different versions loaded onto separate fac-
tors. A two-factor solution was found to exhibit significantly
better fit (χ2 = 10.93, df = 1, p < .01). The mean scores
on these two measures were also significantly different, t(XX)
= 6.48, p < .01.Q9 370
Although scores on the reference-group-free version of the
Conscientiousness scale exhibited the highest correlations with
the various criteria, it is still possible that scores on the various
reference-group versions of the same scale explained variance
in the criteria that was unaccounted for by the reference-group- 375
free version. To examine this possibility, we used hierarchical
regression to assess whether scores on scales with a specified
reference group captured unique variance in relevant criteria
above and beyond the variance accounted for by the reference-
group-free measure. We also examined the reverse model (i.e., 380
the amount of incremental variance accounted for by scores
on the reference-group-free measure). Results for this analysis
across the full range of predictor-criterion pairs are provided in
Table 3 and Table 4. The results illustrate that, for the five criteria
examined, scores on measures of conscientiousness that use ref- 385
erence groups provide relatively little incremental validity over
scores on a reference-group-free measure of conscientiousness
(see Table 3). Scores on the measure of conscientiousness that
use the immediate family reference group explained the largest
amount of incremental variance in the five criteria, reaching sta- 390
tistically significant levels (p < .05) for two of the five criteria.
On the other hand, scores on the reference-group-free measure
of conscientiousness explained much greater incremental vari-
ance in 15 of the 20 reverse models examined (see Table 4).
Discussion 395
Results from Study 1 show that specifying different refer-
ence groups in the instructions for a measure of conscientious-
ness produces significantly different scores, but also that these
scores explain little variance in five relevant criteria over and
above the variance explained by a reference-group-free mea- 400
sure of conscientiousness. These findings suggest that the in-
structions for self-report measures of traits should not specify a
reference group given the subsequent loss of criterion-relevant
information exhibited in this study.
TABLE 4.—Incremental validity of the reference-group-free measure of conscientiousness over four reference-group measures of conscientiousness (Study 1).
Incremental Validity of Reference-Group Free Measure of Conscientiousness Over
Immediate Family Same Age and Gender Friends and Peers People in General
R p R p R p R p
Procrastination .110 <.01 .137 <.01 .155 <.01 .078 <.01
Preventive health behaviors .011 .18 .003 .49 .009 .24 .002 .59
Accident control .055 <.01 .031 .02 .044 <.01 .019 .08
Traffic risk behaviors .092 <.01 .037 <.01 .155 <.01 .070 <.01
Substance risk .113 <.01 .115 <.01 .219 <.01 .077 <.01
Note. All R values are adjusted R values.
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STUDY 2405
We conducted Study 2 to replicate the practically important
findings of Study 1 and also to determine whether the results
from Study 1 generalize to a wider array of personality con-
structs and other important criteria. In addition, we wanted to
determine whether the effect of reference groups influenced410
measures of job attitudes that are important to the study of
work. Some referent, comparator, or frame of reference is cen-
tral to many theories of job attitudes (Hulin & Judge, 2003).
For example, the Cornell Model of job attitudes (Hulin, 1991;
Smith, Kendall, & Hulin, 1969) explicitly models the effect415
of broader social and economic settings as referents that de-
termine the weights given to the cost and benefits of a given
job. Similarly, Thibaut and Kelley’s (1959) comparison level
model involves a comparison of current outcomes to past out-
comes (actually or vicariously experienced) as well as possible420
alternative outcomes; and Locke’s (1976) value-percept modelQ10
stresses the comparison of what an individual wants to what an
individual has as a key influence on job attitudes. Comparisons
with others are also important components of fairness judgments
that appear to be strong determinants of job attitudes (Colquitt,425
Conlon, Wesson, Porter, & Yee, 2001).
To allow a thorough examination of whether personality and
attitude measurement with and without reference groups cap-
tures unique variance in important outcomes, we expanded
the criteria set to variables that have been shown to exhibit430
meaningful relationships with the selected personality and at-
titude constructs in either college (e.g., Chamorro-Premuzic &
Furnham, 2003) or organizational settings (Marcus, Lee, & Ash-
ton, 2007; Meyer, Stanley, Herscovich, & Topolnytsky, 2002).
Specifically, we examined relationships among three sets of435
variables. The first set, self-control and integrity, have both pre-
viously been shown to be useful predictors of counterproductive
behaviors (e.g., Marcus & Schuler, 2004; Ones, Viswesvaran,
& Schmidt, 1993), and we therefore examined their relationship
with counterproductive behaviors in a student setting. Second,440
achievement striving has frequently illustrated significant rela-
tionships with the grade performance of college students (e.g.,
Barling & Charbonneau, 1992; Lievens, DeCorte, & Schollaert,
2008), and we therefore also examined the presence of the RGE
for the relationship between achievement striving and GPA.445
Third, commitment constructs have been shown to exhibit sig-
nificant relationships with withdrawal intentions and cognitions
(see Meyer et al., 2002, for a review), and we therefore also
examined the RGE for the relationship between the construct of
commitment to college and cognitions about withdrawal from450
college.
Based on the results from Study 1, we hypothesized that
scores on measures of personality and attitudes that are free of a
reference group will correlate more strongly with scores on the
respective criteria than scores on measures of personality and455
attitudes that make use of a reference group (i.e., Hypothesis
2a). We also hypothesized that scores on reference-group-free
measures of personality and attitudes will be significantly dif-
ferent from scores on a reference-group measure of the same
personality or attitude construct (i.e., Hypothesis 1). In Study 2,460
we tested these broad hypotheses with only two reference-group
relevant instruction sets: first, a reference-group-free instruction
set; and second, instructions that asked respondents to indicate
their standing relative to people in general. We chose these two
reference group conditions because they represent perhaps the465
most widely used instruction sets for self-report measures of
personality. Although reference groups are typically not speci-
fied for attitude measures, we believe that responses to attitude
measures may still be influenced by individuals’ assessment of
their standing relative to the population in general. For exam- 470
ple, employees may decide that they have only average absolute
levels of commitment to the organization but that their level of
commitment is still significantly higher than the level of com-
mitment that other people have toward their organization. That
is, the response of the individual to a commitment item is likely 475
to be influenced by both the perception of absolute standing and
relative standing. Given that we examined only two reference-
group conditions in Study 2, we were not able to reexamine
Hypothesis 2b.
Method 480
Participants. Participants were 276 undergraduate students
recruited from a psychology research pool at a large university
in the northeastern United States. The average age of the sample
was 19.0 years (SD = 2.86), and participants were mainly White
(68.5%), female (70.7%), and freshmen (57.6%). 485
Measures
Commitment. We assessed commitment to college using an
adapted version of Allen and Meyer’s (1990) 18-item measure
of affective commitment, normative commitment, and continu-
ance commitment. We asked respondents to indicate the degree 490
to which various statements accurately described their attitude
toward the university using 5-point response options ranging
from 1 (Very Inaccurate) to 5 (Very Accurate). We adapted
items to assess commitment to the specific university attended
by participants. Affective commitment (e.g., “I feel like part of 495
the family at this university”) denotes an emotional attachment
to the university, normative commitment (e.g., “I have a duty to
remain with this university”) reflects attachment due to a sense
of obligation, and continuance commitment refers to attachment
that is the result of a perceived lack of alternatives (e.g., “If I 500
left this university I would struggle to be accepted by a better
university”). Internal consistency estimates for the reference-
group-free instruction set were α = .84, .75, and .68, respec-
tively, for affective, normative, and continuance commitment;
and α = .83, .79, and .71, respectively, for the reference-group 505
instruction set. We fixed the order of the two measures such that
the reference-group-free version was administered first.
Personality. We measured three personality traits using
scales from the IPIP (Goldberg et al., 2006). We assessed in-
tegrity and self control each with 10-item scales, and an 11-item 510
scale was used to assess achievement striving. Internal con- Q11
sistency estimates for the reference-group-free instruction set
were α = .73, .88, and .76, respectively, for integrity, achieve-
ment striving, and self control; and α = .75, .86, and .78, re-
spectively, for the reference-group instruction set. We fixed the 515
order of the two measures such that the reference-group-free
version was always administered first.
Counterproductivity. We assessed counterproductivity
using a 40-item scale developed by Hakstian, Farrell, and
Tweed (2002). We asked respondents to indicate the degree to Q12520
which various statements accurately described their behavior
as students using 5-point response options ranging from 1
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(Very Inaccurate) to 5 (Very Accurate). The scale measures
nine facets of counterproductive behavior: cheating (α = .83),
substance abuse (α = .82), low personal standards (α = .73),525
property theft (α = .72), duplicity (α = .63), misrepresentation
(α = .72), work avoidance (α = .63), petty personal gain (α =
.72), and indolence (α = .55).
Withdrawal intentions. We used three items with 5-point
response options ranging from 1 (Very Inaccurate) to 5 (Very530
Accurate) to assess participants’ intention to withdraw from col-
lege. The items were the following: I have thought about leaving
(the university), I have made plans to leave (the university), and
I have tried to find another university that I can attend. The in-
ternal consistency estimate for scores on these three items was535
α = .87.
GPA. We gathered GPA data by asking students to self-
report their GPA. Meta-analytic findings by Kuncel, Crede´, and
Thomas (2005) showed that self-reported GPA correlates highly
with actual GPA.540
Results
Table 5 presents the zero order correlations, reliability es-
timates, and means and standard deviations of the variables
included in Study 2. The reliabilities for all measures of per-
sonality and commitment are sound (α > .70), with only scores545
on some of the subscales of the counterproductivity scales ex-
hibiting more modest internal consistency estimates, which is
not surprising given the relatively small number of items in
the scales and the low base rate of the phenomena assessed by
individual items (e.g., cheating on tests). The correlations be-550
tween scores with and without a reference group specified for
the six commitment and personality scales ranged from r = .46
(integrity) to r = .67 (affective commitment). In support of Hy-
pothesis 1, in repeated-measures ANOVAs, we found significant
(p < .01) changes in all six of the examined variables across555
the reference-group and reference-group-free conditions, with
effect sizes (Cohen’s d) of 0.41 (affective commitment), 0.18
(normative commitment), 0.43 (continuance commitment), 0.41
(integrity), 0.53 (achievement striving), and –0.60 (self-control).
In support of Hypothesis 2a, scores on the reference-group-560
free predictor measures exhibited higher validities than scores
on the reference-group predictor measures for 21 out of the 22
hypothesized predictor-criteria relationships. Using the Meng,
Rosenthal, and Rubin (1992) procedure for comparing cor-
related correlations, nine of the validity coefficients for the565
reference-group-free measure were significantly larger (p <
.01) than the corresponding validity coefficient for the reference-
group measure. In the only instance for which the reference-
group measure was more strongly related to the criteria than the
reference-group-free measure (normative commitment), the dif-570
ference in correlation was not significant. The largest differences
between validity coefficients for reference-group measures and
reference-group-free measures were observed for self-control
and integrity.
Incremental validity. We used usefulness analysis to assess575
whether scores on scales with and without a specified reference
group capture unique variance in relevant criteria. Results for
this analysis across the full range of predictor-criterion pairs are
provided in Table 6 and Table 7. Results indicate that, in general,
TABLE 6.—Usefulness analysis of two versions of three commitment types and
achievement striving with regard to withdrawal cognition and GPA (Study 2).
Criteria
Withdrawal Cognition College GPA
Term Entered Second in R R
Hierarchical Regression
Affective commitment .106**
Affective commitment: Reference .004
Normative commitment .038**
Normative commitment: Reference .024**
Continuance commitment .02**
Continuance commitment: Reference .000
Achievement striving .015*
Achievement striving: Reference .012
Note. All R values are adjusted values. Affective commitment = reference-group-
free measure of affective commitment; affective commitment reference = measure of
commitment with reference group specified in instructions.
p < .05. **p < .01.
scores on measures that included mention of a reference group in 580
the instruction set provide little incremental validity over scores
on the same measure assessed without mention of a reference
group. Even in those rare cases in which statistically significant
amounts of incremental variance are accounted for by scores
on the reference-group measure, the absolute amount of incre- 585
mental variance was relatively small. This effect was evident
both for measures of attitudes and for measures of personal-
ity. Reverse models showed largely opposing effects. That is,
scores on reference-group-free measures explained substantial
amounts of incremental variance over reference-group measures 590
of the same construct in almost all cases.
Discussion
Study 2 extends Study 1 to the measurement of both attitudes
and personality traits while also examining a wider variety of
criteria. The results from Study 2 are largely similar to those 595
of Study 1 in that RGE can be produced by small changes in
the instruction sets provided for inventories of personality and
attitudes and that the use of reference groups in the instruction
set appears to significantly reduce the criterion-related validity
of scores on measures of both personality traits and attitudes. 600
TABLE 7.—Usefulness analysis for two versions of integrity and self-control
with regard to counterproductivity (Study 2).
Variable Entered Second in Hierarchical Regression
Integrity: Self-Control:
Criteria Integrity Reference Self-Control Reference
Cheating .072** .005 .036* .003
Substance abuse .065** .012 .147** .019*
Low personal standards .046** .000 .239** .001
Theft .038* .005 .016 .001
Duplicity .03* .002 .042** .001
Misrepresentation .043** .004 .034* .001
Work avoidance .03* .012 .037* .000
Petty personal gain .096** .000 .010 .005
Indolence .137** .000 .122** .001
Note. All R values are adjusted R values. Integrity = reference-group-free measure
of integrity; integrity reference group = measure of integrity with reference group specified
in instructions.
p < .05. **p < .01.
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GENERAL DISCUSSION
The results of the two studies we discussed in this article sug-
gest that reference group judgments exert a significant influence
on responses to the types of inventories commonly used to as-
sess self-rated personality. These findings contribute further to605
understanding how instruction sets can influence the manner in
which individuals respond to inventories. Three findings appear
particularly relevant. First, an individual’s score on an inventory
is substantially influenced by the reference group that is spec-
ified in the instruction set; that is, different reference groups610
result in substantial within-person variability in scores. Second,
there are substantial differences across individuals in the types
of reference groups they report using when responding to self-
report inventories, and there was substantial variation across
participants in how important they rated each of the specified615
reference groups. Third, and perhaps most important, the use
of reference groups resulted in significant and, at times, dra-
matic decrements in the criterion-related validity of scores on
standard inventories of personality. Scores on measures that did
not specify a reference group exhibited higher criterion-related620
validities than scores on measures that did specify a reference
group across nearly all of the criteria examined.
We believe that there are two main reasons why scores on
trait inventories that are based on reference-group comparisons
are less strongly related to criteria than are scores on inventories625
of the same construct that are not based on reference-group
judgments. First, test takers are unlikely to view the specified
reference group in the same manner, in effect setting up distinct
scaling standards for each individual. That is, individual A’s
perception of the “same age and gender” reference group is630
likely to be meaningfully different to individual B’s perception
of the “same age and gender group” reference group—even if the
two individuals are, in fact, of the same age and gender. Second,
there is little theoretical reason why an individual’s standing on
a trait relative to a reference group should be relevant to the635
behaviors engaged in by that individual—unless the behavior
is specifically constrained by the utilized reference group (e.g.,
relative levels of extroversion predicting the amount of time
that an individual speaks within a peer reference group). In
most organizational and research settings, the absolute levels640
of a trait are likely to be substantially more predictive of the
enactment of related behaviors.
Many researchers make use of self-report inventories that
specify a reference group in the instruction set provided to re-
search participants, the widely used IPIP scales being perhaps645
the most obvious example. It is also likely that similar instruc-
tions sets are utilized in selection setting (e.g., “indicate how
well the statement describes the applicant relative to other ap-
plicants for this job”). This approach does not appear to be
optimal in terms of obtaining scores with maximum levels of650
criterion validity, and we suggest that reference-group instruc-
tion sets only be included with careful consideration of the
appropriateness of such comparisons to the research question
or selection setting. Our findings would suggest that instruc-
tion sets without reference groups are likely to be preferable655
to instruction sets that refer test takers to a particular reference
group. The implications of these findings are not only restricted
to settings in which reference-group judgments are explicitly
solicited. Findings from the cross-cultural area (e.g., Heine
et al., 2008, 2002) would suggest that reference-group judg-660
ments are used by at least some test takers even when not
explicitly solicited in the instruction sets of inventories. That
is, test takers are likely to naturally refer to reference groups
when deciding on responses to inventory items, especially if the
setting in which data is being collected or other questions that 665
are asked activate a particular reference group. The availability
heuristic (Tversky & Kahneman, 1973), for example, would sug-
gest that data gathered in a work setting may activate a coworker
reference group, data collected in a selection context may ac-
tivate a fellow applicant reference group, and data collected in 670
a school setting may activate a reference group comprised of
fellow students. The recent review by Goodman and Haisley
(2007) also establishes the substantial evidence that individu-
als in work settings make use of a variety of reference groups
when evaluating themselves or their jobs. Future research may 675
benefit by examining if the criterion-related validity of trait in-
ventories can be further improved with an explicit request to test
takers to base their responses on their perceived absolute level
of the trait in question, thereby ameliorating the tendency to
implicitly base their responses on a salient reference group. Fu- 680
ture research should also examine how situational factors and
individual differences influence the use of different reference
groups. It is possible, for example, that extroverted individuals
rely on reference group comparisons to a greater degree than
introverted individuals in arriving at responses to individual 685
items.
Our findings also suggest that scores on measures using spe-
cific reference groups (e.g., immediate family; Study 1) may
provide meaningful levels of incremental validity over scores on
a reference-group-free measure of the same construct. Further 690
investigations into whether specific reference group measures
may provide criterion-relevant information appear warranted,
although such incremental validity is likely to be highly depen-
dent on the nature of the criterion. We would expect incremental
validity of scores affected by RGE to be largest for criteria that 695
also reflect relative standing. For example, scores on a measure
of achievement striving assessed with a peer reference group
for high school students might be particularly strongly related
to high school rank.
Our findings also have implications for organizational selec- 700
tion processes that are increasingly incorporating personality
and other self-report data. The selection process in which indi-
viduals are explicitly being compared to other applicants or (in
the case of promotion decisions) other incumbents seems par-
ticularly prone to RGE—even if no reference group is specified 705
in the instruction sets. Incumbents applying for a promotion are
likely to be aware of the fact that they are being compared to
other employees and may therefore naturally revert to reference-
group-based judgments. If RGE in selection contexts lead to a
similar degradation of criterion-related validities as witnessed 710
in this study, then organizations may benefit significantly from
efforts that attempt to reduce the degree to which responses to
inventories in the selection context are based on social com-
parison processes. Such efforts could involve simply not using
instructions sets that include mention of a reference group or 715
explicitly asking applicants to indicate their absolute level of
the construct being assessed. Such relatively minor changes to
the instruction format of rating forms may not only increase the
criterion-related validity of self-ratings but also the validity of
ratings provided by others (e.g., spouse, coworker, supervisor). 720
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